THIRD EYE CAPITAL The power of a motion court to grant vesting orders is found under s. 100 of the CJA, which provides that a “court may by order vest in any person an interest in real or personal property that the court has authority to order be disposed of, encumbered or conveyed.” The change in the source of the court’s jurisdiction to grant vesting orders did not change its application. Rather, s.100 of the CJA has been recognized to only provide for a, “mechanism to give the applicant the ownership or possession of property to which he or she is otherwise entitled.”4 Finally, the most unique feature of the vesting order is its dual nature. The Court of Appeal of Ontario in Regal Constellation Hotel Ltd., Re5 opined that a vesting order is a court order on the one hand and a conveyance of title on the other. The court held that “once the vesting order is registered on title, its attributes as a conveyance prevail and its attributes as a court order are spent,” at which point the change of title is effected and any appeal from it is moot. This important ramification on a party’s ability to appeal was addressed in Third Eye Capital, where the court found the appeal not to be moot mainly due to the fact that the issue of the motion court’s jurisdiction to grant the vesting order was and still is unresolved. 3. ADDITIONAL SUBMIS- SIONS BY THE PARTIES i) Appellant’s Submissions In response to the Court of Appeal’s question, 235 Co. followed a strict reading of the statute. It submitted that save for extremely narrow exceptions, none of which apply to the case on appeal, nothing in s. 100 of the CJA, 243 of the BIA or the inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Court allows the court to vest out third party proprietary interests. Consequently, 235 Co. submitted that the Superior Court had no authority to extinguish a royalty that is an interest in land as it is not the property of the debtor. In its submissions, 235 Co. first addressed s.100 CJA. It argued that a vesting order is a remedy that either gives effect to a party’s ownership interests in property held by another, or else is based on liability or obligation of the property owner to the party in whom the property is vested. 235 Co. acknowledged the existence of circumstances under which the Superior Court can vest out third party proprietary interests; however, clarifying that these circumstances are extremely narrow, having arisen previously in cases involving unpaid child support6 or in cases where third party interests are not known or are reasonably not expected to exist.7 Second, 235 Co. addressed the Superior Court’s ability to vest under s. 243 of the BIA. It stated that although s. 243 of the BIA enables the court to vest out real property, this jurisdiction only applies to the property of the insolvent or bankrupt party. Based on this proposition, the weighing of the equities in vesting third party proprietary rights is inappropriate and historically has only been done where the interest in land is either “contingent” or “incomplete.” 235 Co. explained that contingent interests in land typically arise from an agreement between a third party and the eventual insolvent party where the agreement to acquire the real property is only partially performed such that title to the property remains with the insolvent party at the time of insolvency. 235 Co. argued that since in its case the GORs were not “contingent” or “incomplete,” they could not be vested under s. 243 of the BIA. Third, in addressing the point of inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Court, 235 Co. submitted that the court’s inherent jurisdiction is “an inherent power to control its own process and procedure” and does not extend “to creating new substantive rights or abrogating existing substantive rights.” As a result, whether by itself or in conjunction with s. 100 of the CJA or s. 243 of the BIA, inherent jurisdiction does not empower the court to vest out a party’s proprietary rights.8 Finally, 235 Co. submitted that it was not aware of any developments in commercial practices, granting the courts the authority “to vest out virtually any interest in an asset.” ii) Respondent’s Submissions The Respondent, Third Eye Capital Corporation, argued in its additional submissions that commercial and judicial practices have evolved to recognize Why Advertise? Why Advertise? 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